#### The one place for your designs

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*Created by: nathan-at-least*

From the FAQ:

```
Which are rules of Web of Trust?
Joining the Web of Trust requires to fit 3 conditions:
an identity must gathers a minimum number of links
an identity cannot have twice a same link for a given period
an identity must be between [0, maxStep] distance from any other identity
Where:
step 0 is the identity itself
step n is an identity directly known by step n-1
```

This answer should link to a document which argues why these heuristics protect against Sybil attackers.

**Proposed Sybil Attack:**

Imagine an identity requires `K`

links and an attacker controls `K`

identities all of which are `maxStep - 1`

distance from all other identities. Let's call these `K`

identities *bridge identities*. Now, the attacker can begin generating new identities rapidly. Call these *Sybil identities*. For each Sybil identity, the attacker signs a link from each of the `K`

bridge identities pointing to the new Sybil identity.

Each Sybil identity has `K`

links from the bridge identities (criterion 1). This signing happens during each period (criterion 2), and the distance from any Sybil identity to any other is `maxStep`

because of the location of the bridge identities (criterion 3).

Is this attack feasible? If not, why not?

Whether or not this attack is feasible, a useful security model would provide a rationale for the three criteria above (or any other local heuristics or protocol security features).

To enable design management, you'll need to meet the requirements. If you need help, reach out to our support team for assistance.